• FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-26:39.execve

    From FreeBSD Security Advisories@3:633/10 to All on Tuesday, June 30, 2026 21:00:11
    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
    Hash: SHA512

    ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-26:39.execve Security Advisory
    The FreeBSD Project

    Topic: Local privilege escalation via execve(2) TOCTOU race

    Category: core
    Module: execve
    Announced: 2026-06-30
    Credits: Synacktiv
    Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
    Corrected: 2026-06-26 22:20:44 UTC (stable/15, 15.1-STABLE)
    2026-06-30 17:21:55 UTC (releng/15.1, 15.1-RELEASE-p1)
    2026-06-30 17:21:22 UTC (releng/15.0, 15.0-RELEASE-p11)
    2026-06-28 00:30:18 UTC (stable/14, 14.4-STABLE)
    2026-06-30 17:20:55 UTC (releng/14.4, 14.4-RELEASE-p7)
    2026-06-30 17:20:28 UTC (releng/14.3, 14.3-RELEASE-p16)
    CVE Name: CVE-2026-49415

    For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
    including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.

    I. Background

    The execve(2) system call replaces the calling process's image with a
    new executable. When the target binary is set-user-ID (SUID), the
    kernel installs a new virtual address space containing the binary's
    code and data, then changes the process credentials to those of the
    file owner.

    II. Problem Description

    During execve(2) of a SUID binary, the new virtual address space is
    installed before the process credentials are updated. During this
    window, a process running as the same user can access the target
    process's memory via procfs or linprocfs, because the kernel's
    debugging permission check still saw the original credentials.

    III. Impact

    An unprivileged local user can exploit this race to modify the
    address space of a SUID binary before its credentials are elevated,
    potentially gaining full control of the affected system.

    IV. Workaround

    No workaround is available.

    V. Solution

    Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
    release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date, and
    reboot the system.

    Perform one of the following:

    1) To update your vulnerable system installed from base system packages:

    Systems running a 15.0-RELEASE or later version of FreeBSD on the amd64 or arm64 platforms, which were installed using base system packages, can be updated via the pkg(8) utility:

    # pkg upgrade -r FreeBSD-base
    # shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for a security update"

    2) To update your vulnerable system installed from binary distribution sets:

    Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the amd64 or arm64 platforms which were not installed using base system packages can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:

    # freebsd-update fetch
    # freebsd-update install
    # shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for a security update"

    3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:

    The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
    FreeBSD release branches.

    a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
    detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.

    [FreeBSD 15.x]
    # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-26:39/execve-15.patch
    # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-26:39/execve-15.patch.asc
    # gpg --verify execve-15.patch.asc

    [FreeBSD 14.4]
    # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-26:39/execve-14.4.patch
    # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-26:39/execve-14.4.patch.asc
    # gpg --verify execve-14.4.patch.asc

    [FreeBSD 14.3]
    # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-26:39/execve-14.3.patch
    # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-26:39/execve-14.3.patch.asc
    # gpg --verify execve-14.3.patch.asc

    b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:

    # cd /usr/src
    # patch -E -p0 < /path/to/patch

    c) Recompile your kernel as described in <URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
    system.

    VI. Correction details

    This issue is corrected as of the corresponding Git commit hash in the following stable and release branches:

    Branch/path Hash Revision
    - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/15/ a80e40ce9ee0 stable/15-n284141 releng/15.1/ 46f7b5a64048 releng/15.1-n283567 releng/15.0/ de7144f7c391 releng/15.0-n281069 stable/14/ bb1154f3ea20 stable/14-n274435 releng/14.4/ 8fbbc185a3ff releng/14.4-n273729 releng/14.3/ 6772a8ece2c0 releng/14.3-n271529
    - -------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Run the following command to see which files were modified by a
    particular commit:

    # git show --stat <commit hash>

    Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the hash:

    <URL:https://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=NNNNNN>

    To determine the commit count in a working tree (for comparison against
    nNNNNNN in the table above), run:

    # git rev-list --count --first-parent HEAD

    VII. References

    <URL:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-49415>

    The latest revision of this advisory is available at <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-26:39.execve.asc> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

    iQJPBAEBCgA5FiEEthUnfoEIffdcgYM7bljekB8AGu8FAmpEEjcbFIAAAAAABAAO bWFudTIsMi41KzEuMTIsMCwzAAoJEG5Y3pAfABrvI88QAI5z9LuCV46PtN5Nxw7f wv6davrwFt1N/q+hXVXKR0LNU7Q7nB5okGi0ipcjSqIC/9OaTMl9BsT7dA3yxeZi D1SN0kdrUyTsCNy2jMR/jd21uUMpcMHJYeUEzp9SNtiMwEEWYXNgsr5mX3sqG7/Z W6RJ5xBXfG0rePsXQ2wRkYsEZzK+sJJWSgPmxqRu+ruQYollVTExjOZfSm7l1ipq GS150pQ3kw5XNv2+fTnTxphJCXXvB9ZQRYb0ks4D3E/+r/bmY+OZmdnhGzCh6gEh Es4FmUAAWFbTtu355GcwOR+wy5AG1BxDVL+0D/8mM2EhbKBM5In54Q6JteMl7JeT DL1kt9nGOG5KXOZmcJdL5vsFg6vbdDvTGD1ufgcddesp6qD5JYh00Gg/2zQTxLjj EHIc0Oked/eIwObSKypbSYICGQRLC8QdeisdoDgmbWHAxc1OBJY/o+T6emcsDbT8 qpl3e9CNcGTRAznrrfHS3WJatIHcvLPInxKleXUbXAwcI5IzOWDGuBgOg/GeSdsz ybPU1NMsT+vqOQ67O7ENjJo/djXxyTQI/ExUR9nFrKZL/ma3EP4G+xyD+1pFW+Pk HCm1RbMayr75ck7Wb6rjbc6fgPIK/djz1f2rzYMFipt8U1qiiAN552AQ6/mFMjGS Dp8iGjzGu60Hf9IaLXxTOcYV
    =HivV
    -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


    --- PyGate Linux v1.5.18
    * Origin: Dragon's Lair, PyGate NNTP<>Fido Gate (3:633/10)