• FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-26:81.vfs

    From FreeBSD Security Advisories@3:633/10 to All on Wednesday, November 18, 2026 01:00:44
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    ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-26:81.vfs Security Advisory
    The FreeBSD Project

    Topic: Capsicum and O_RESOLVE_BENEATH bypass at mount roots

    Category: core
    Module: vfs
    Announced: 2026-11-17
    Credits: Pawel Dawidek
    Credits: Lexi Winter
    Affects: FreeBSD 15.1
    Corrected: 2026-11-17 17:06:00 UTC (stable/15, 15.2-STABLE)
    2026-11-17 17:08:16 UTC (releng/15.1, 15.1-RELEASE-p7)
    CVE Name: CVE-2026-101312

    For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
    including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.

    I. Background

    Capsicum is a capability and sandbox framework. A process in capability mode can only access files through paths relative to directory descriptors it already holds, using openat(2) and the other *at() system calls. The kernel confines such lookups beneath the starting directory, failing any ".." component that would leave the starting directory with ENOTCAPABLE. The same confinement applies outside capability mode to directory descriptors limited with cap_rights_limit(2), and to lookups using the O_RESOLVE_BENEATH or AT_RESOLVE_BENEATH flags.

    By default, all such lookups can use a ".." component that stays beneath the starting directory, for example "sub/..". The vfs.lookup_cap_dotdot sysctl controls this behavior in capability mode and for capability-limited
    directory descriptors.

    II. Problem Description

    To resolve ".." from the root of a mounted file system, the kernel first
    steps to the directory on which that file system is mounted, then looks up
    ".." there. The check for leaving the starting directory compared against
    the mount point rather than the root of the mounted file system. If the starting directory was itself the root of a mounted file system, the check never matched, and the lookup escaped to the parent of the mount point.

    III. Impact

    A sandboxed process, or a program relying on O_RESOLVE_BENEATH or AT_RESOLVE_BENEATH, whose starting directory is the root of a mounted file system can access any file under its root directory. The descriptor's rights and normal file system permissions still apply. Lookups that start in any other directory are not affected.

    IV. Workaround

    No complete workaround is available. Setting the vfs.lookup_cap_dotdot
    sysctl to 0 refuses all ".." components in capability mode and for capability-limited descriptors:

    # sysctl vfs.lookup_cap_dotdot=0

    This also refuses components that stay beneath the starting directory, such
    as "sub/..", which some applications need, and has no effect on O_RESOLVE_BENEATH or AT_RESOLVE_BENEATH lookups outside capability mode.

    V. Solution

    Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
    release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date,
    and reboot the system.

    Perform one of the following:

    1) To update your vulnerable system installed from base system packages:

    Systems running a 15.0-RELEASE or later version of FreeBSD on the amd64 or arm64 platforms, which were installed using base system packages, can be updated via the pkg(8) utility:

    # pkg upgrade -r FreeBSD-base
    # shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for a security update"

    2) To update your vulnerable system installed from binary distribution sets:

    Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the amd64 or arm64 platforms which were not installed using base system packages can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:

    # freebsd-update fetch
    # freebsd-update install
    # shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for a security update"

    3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:

    The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
    FreeBSD release branches.

    a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
    detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.

    # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-26:81/vfs.patch
    # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-26:81/vfs.patch.asc
    # gpg --verify vfs.patch.asc

    b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:

    # cd /usr/src
    # patch -E -p0 < /path/to/patch

    c) Recompile your kernel as described in <URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
    system.

    VI. Correction details

    This issue is corrected as of the corresponding Git commit hash in the following stable and release branches:

    Branch/path Hash Revision
    - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/15/ 9b7c7bcebd4d stable/15-n286871 releng/15.1/ c0de320f18f0 releng/15.1-n283674
    - -------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Run the following command to see which files were modified by a
    particular commit:

    # git show --stat <commit hash>

    Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the hash:

    <URL:https://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=NNNNNN>

    To determine the commit count in a working tree (for comparison against
    nNNNNNN in the table above), run:

    # git rev-list --count --first-parent HEAD

    VII. References

    The commit that introduced the problem: <URL:https://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=2f60984053e5> <URL:https://reviews.freebsd.org/D50648>

    <URL:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-101312>

    The latest revision of this advisory is available at <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-26:81.vfs.asc> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

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