• FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-26:76.ocs_fc

    From FreeBSD Security Advisories@3:633/10 to All on Wednesday, November 18, 2026 01:00:28
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    ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-26:76.ocs_fc Security Advisory
    The FreeBSD Project

    Topic: Multiple vulnerabilities in the ocs_fc(4) driver

    Category: core
    Module: ocs_fc
    Announced: 2026-11-17
    Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
    Corrected: 2026-11-03 08:56:14 UTC (stable/15, 15.1-STABLE)
    2026-11-17 17:08:06 UTC (releng/15.1, 15.1-RELEASE-p7)
    2026-11-03 09:00:17 UTC (stable/14, 14.5-STABLE)
    2026-11-17 17:05:06 UTC (releng/14.5, 14.5-RELEASE-p4)
    2026-11-17 17:04:08 UTC (releng/14.4, 14.4-RELEASE-p13)
    CVE Name: CVE-2026-127752, CVE-2026-127753, CVE-2026-127754

    For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
    including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.

    I. Background

    The ocs_fc(4) driver supports Emulex Fibre Channel host bus adapters in
    both initiator and target modes. It provides a management interface to userspace through /dev/ocsN device nodes.

    II. Problem Description

    Several vulnerabilities were found in the ocs_fc(4) driver.

    The driver's ioctl(2) interface, which members of the operator group can access, did not require superuser privileges and did not adequately
    validate requests. Among other problems, it failed to bound
    user-supplied buffer sizes and PCI configuration space offsets, and could
    issue adapter commands referencing freed memory. (CVE-2026-127752)

    The driver did not adequately validate the length of FCP command frames received from initiators, and did not range check exchange identifiers
    reported by the adapter, potentially leading to out-of-bounds memory
    accesses. (CVE-2026-127753)

    When rejecting a Process Login (PRLI) request with an unsupported FC-4
    type, the driver sent a second response for the same exchange, resulting
    in a use-after-free. Any port which had completed a Port Login (PLOGI)
    could trigger this with a single PRLI. Additionally, formatting the
    adapter's active profile ID could overflow a stack buffer.
    (CVE-2026-127754)

    III. Impact

    A local user in the operator group can use the ioctl(2) interface to
    corrupt kernel memory or reprogram the adapter, potentially gaining full control of the system. A remote port on the same Fibre Channel fabric
    can trigger a use-after-free or out-of-bounds memory access in the
    kernel, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) or potentially arbitrary
    code execution in the kernel.

    IV. Workaround

    No workaround is available, but systems without adapters supported by
    ocs_fc(4) are not affected.

    V. Solution

    Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
    release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date,
    and reboot the system.

    Perform one of the following:

    1) To update your vulnerable system installed from base system packages:

    Systems running a 15.0-RELEASE or later version of FreeBSD on the amd64 or arm64 platforms, which were installed using base system packages, can be updated via the pkg(8) utility:

    # pkg upgrade -r FreeBSD-base
    # shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for a security update"

    2) To update your vulnerable system installed from binary distribution sets:

    Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the amd64 or arm64 platforms which were not installed using base system packages can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:

    # freebsd-update fetch
    # freebsd-update install
    # shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for a security update"

    3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:

    The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
    FreeBSD release branches.

    a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
    detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.

    # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-26:76/ocs_fc.patch
    # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-26:76/ocs_fc.patch.asc
    # gpg --verify ocs_fc.patch.asc

    b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:

    # cd /usr/src
    # patch -E -p0 < /path/to/patch

    c) Recompile your kernel as described in <URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
    system.

    VI. Correction details

    This issue is corrected as of the corresponding Git commit hash in the following stable and release branches:

    Branch/path Hash Revision
    - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/15/ fab3594e208f stable/15-n286564 releng/15.1/ 0e43807b1535 releng/15.1-n283664 stable/14/ 5f5d5abc37d0 stable/14-n275444 releng/14.5/ 10783f288172 releng/14.5-n274908 releng/14.4/ c37ff9b36ee9 releng/14.4-n273809
    - -------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Run the following command to see which files were modified by a
    particular commit:

    # git show --stat <commit hash>

    Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the hash:

    <URL:https://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=NNNNNN>

    To determine the commit count in a working tree (for comparison against
    nNNNNNN in the table above), run:

    # git rev-list --count --first-parent HEAD

    VII. References

    <URL:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-127752> <URL:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-127753> <URL:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-127754>

    The latest revision of this advisory is available at <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-26:76.ocs_fc.asc> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

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