Any point to password protecting the bios if only 3 people in the
household, and 2 know nothing about bioses?
I just finished a 40 minute phone call iwth a 37 yo friend, the son of friends, who is locked in the mental ward of a nearby hospital and who
has such problems for at least 18 years,. And his words were indeed
full of craziness, but i need to show that I take his wishes seriously,
even if I don't actually fulfill them.
But I need advice:
Is there any point to password protecting the BIOS on a windows machine
if you live only with your parents who love you (although he's having
doubts abou that now), and who also wouldn't know how to modify the BIOS either to break it or to fix it even if they tried. IOW, who know
nothing about the BIOS.
I see why he password protected windows, for privacy, but it seems to me
he's just looking for trouble with the BIOS, in that he may forget his
own password. Woudn't that be a big problem? Well, I guess maybe even
that woudln't matter because if it's currently set correctly now, the computer will continue to work, even if some change is later
recommended, right?
He told me the passwords and I wrote them down. Is it still likely I can easily remove the BIOS password now, so it doesn't cause problems in the future (this assumes I will at some point touch his computer, which is
not very likely, but again, I want him to know I take him seriously
(when it's possible, and here it seems possible).)
Any point to password protecting the bios if only 3 people in the
household, and 2 know nothing about bioses?
However, if you were wanting to protect your Data from so burglar ....
then maybe!! (if you are a pessimist!!)
On 20/01/2026 1:44 pm, micky wrote:Since when did thieves and burglars lose interest in computers?
Any point to password protecting the bios if only 3 people in the
household, and 2 know nothing about bioses?
So one person is protecting their computer from themselves. Not much use!
Brian Gregory wrote:
On 20/01/2026 08:57, Daniel70 wrote:
On 20/01/2026 1:44 pm, micky wrote:Since when did thieves and burglars lose interest in computers?
Any point to password protecting the bios if only 3 people in the
household, and 2 know nothing about bioses?
So one person is protecting their computer from themselves. Not much
use!
Unless you're Jeffrey Epstein, they likely want the hardware, not the data.
Brian Gregory wrote:
Since when did thieves and burglars lose interest in computers?
Unless you're Jeffrey Epstein, they likely want the hardware, not the
data.
On Tue, 20 Jan 2026 19:57:44 +1100, Daniel70
<daniel47@nomail.afraid.org> wrote:
However, if you were wanting to protect your Data from so burglar .... >>then maybe!! (if you are a pessimist!!)When a house near me was burgled a few years ago they weren't
interested in consumer electronics, only jewellery. Which suggests
that they knew there was jewellery present but that's another story.
(I have a NAS in my hall, and suspect that in the event of burglary it
would be ignored. (There are others backing it up elsehere in the
house that are not so obvious.))
On 20/01/2026 1:44 pm, micky wrote:
Any point to password protecting the bios if only 3 people in the
household, and 2 know nothing about bioses?
So one person is protecting their computer from themselves. Not much use!
However, if you were wanting to protect your Data from so burglar ....
then maybe!! (if you are a pessimist!!)
If you were wanting to protect your data from someone who is
semi-computer literate, then Password Protecting might be useful ....
but then, all your burglar would need would be a USB drive with Linux >installed on it.
I just finished a 40 minute phone call iwth a 37 yo friend, the son of
friends, who is locked in the mental ward of a nearby hospital and who
has such problems for at least 18 years,. And his words were indeed
full of craziness, but i need to show that I take his wishes seriously,
even if I don't actually fulfill them.
But I need advice:
Is there any point to password protecting the BIOS on a windows machine
if you live only with your parents who love you (although he's having
doubts abou that now), and who also wouldn't know how to modify the BIOS
either to break it or to fix it even if they tried. IOW, who know
nothing about the BIOS.
I see why he password protected windows, for privacy, but it seems to me
he's just looking for trouble with the BIOS, in that he may forget his
own password. Woudn't that be a big problem? Well, I guess maybe even
that woudln't matter because if it's currently set correctly now, the
computer will continue to work, even if some change is later
recommended, right?
He told me the passwords and I wrote them down. Is it still likely I can
easily remove the BIOS password now, so it doesn't cause problems in the
future (this assumes I will at some point touch his computer, which is
not very likely, but again, I want him to know I take him seriously
(when it's possible, and here it seems possible).)
AJL wrote:
Unless you're Jeffrey Epstein, they likely want the hardware, not
the data.
True. But even then the reason for having a device lock is to make
wiping it easier than the perp (or new owner) browsing your data
and then wiping it...
Well, I don't disagree that adding a pin/password/biometric or other marketing gimmick is necessary for people "who live in the slums".
But I'm not afraid of my wife. I'm not afraid of my family. I'm not
afraid of my friends. I'm not afraid of my neighbors.
The amount of times anyone is burglarized is so minuscule
it's something that has to be weighed against the inconvenience of
all this 'security'.
On Tue, 20 Jan 2026 19:57:44 +1100, Daniel70
<daniel47@nomail.afraid.org> wrote:
However, if you were wanting to protect your Data from so burglar ....When a house near me was burgled a few years ago they weren't
then maybe!! (if you are a pessimist!!)
interested in consumer electronics, only jewellery.
Which suggests
that they knew there was jewellery present but that's another story.
(I have a NAS in my hall, and suspect that in the event of burglary it
would be ignored. (There are others backing it up elsehere in the
house that are not so obvious.))
On 1/20/2026 1:39 PM, Maria Sophia wrote:
AJL wrote:
Unless you're Jeffrey Epstein, they likely want the hardware, not
the data.
True. But even then the reason for having a device lock is to make
wiping it easier than the perp (or new owner) browsing your data
and then wiping it...
Well, I don't disagree that adding a pin/password/biometric or other marketing gimmick is necessary for people "who live in the slums".
In my last life I took 1000s of burglary reports. The better parts of
town were definitely not spared. Not even those living on the mountain
sides in their million dollar homes.
But I'm not afraid of my wife. I'm not afraid of my family. I'm not
afraid of my friends. I'm not afraid of my neighbors.
Me neither. If you're burglarized the perps will likely not be from
your neighborhood.
The amount of times anyone is burglarized is so minuscule
But I'll bet you have homeowners insurance that covers it.
it's something that has to be weighed against the inconvenience of
all this 'security'.
The insurance of a pin/print is not a great inconvenience IMO. YMMV as always...
Most people use the OS security for their computers. However As IWhen a house near me was burgled a few years ago they weren't
Brian Gregory wrote:
Unless you're Jeffrey Epstein, they likely want the hardware, not the
data.
Duh! We're dealing entirely with unlikely situations here. My laptop
isn't stolen regularly, say about once every year.
Stolen laptops, from domestic homes are likely to be quickly sold for
drug money in some back alley to someone who will then have a long
time to go through their contents and work out how to use anything
interesting they find.
I'm making a philosophical point, which is who needs marketing gimmicks?
I've never been 'burgled' but if I was, my passwords are in KeepassXC, and
my financial data is in veracrypt containers, so all they get are my pics.
Which is the key point, really...
We don't *need* silly marketing security (e.g., biometric gimmicks) for a home computer as long as we don't live in the slums... :)
If we live in the slums, then by all means, we need those silly marketing gimmicks, and, unfortunately, on iOS devices, the gimmicks are required.
It intrigues me when I see someone who has to enter a Password on
their Mobile Phone before they can use it.
WHY?? As long as YOU don't lose your mobile phone, WHY do you need to
secure it??
(I don't do Banking/Credit Card on my mobile phone so what would I
lose if I lost it?? Photos!!)
Computers and the like are bulky and difficult to carry.
Frank Slootweg wrote:
Please don't spoil his rant with facts from the real world.
Please do not describe an intelligent technical description of how to properly set up a computer or phone as a "rant", Frank.
Just stop it with your incessant personal-attack childishness.
It's always you who throws the first punch, Frank.
But I'm not responding to your never-ending personal attacks, Frank.
I'm just asking you politely and publicly to cut it out.
Stick to the technical topic, Frank.
If you have nothing technical to say, Frank, then please refrain from personal attacks simply because you can't address the technical issues.
You don't have to agree that people who have good privacy practices have no need for silly biometric gimmicks, but you should at least attempt to understand the value of encrypted containers (e.g., Veracrypt) and
encrypted databases (e.g., KeepassDX).
Frank,
I'm asking you again, politely, to please stop it with your never-ending endlessly incessant needless personal attacks. Just cut it out, Frank.
If you can't address the issue of how to set up a device with privacy, then don't incessantly attack people who suggest technical solutions such as:
1. Encrypted containers
<https://veracrypt.io/en/Home.html>
2. Encrypted password databases
<https://www.keepassdx.com/>
In addition, since I understand why marketing wants us to fall for silly biometric gimmicks,
I also recommend that people NOT log into motherships,
but I'm well aware that most people aren't even aware that's possible.
To help others understand that it's not only possible, but easy to do,
I wrote a technical report recently on how to use Windows 11 without the mothership login (which is a technical whack-a-mole that keeps changing).
Newsgroups: alt.comp.os.windows-11,alt.comp.hardware.pc-homebuilt,alt.comp.microsoft.windows
Subject: PSA: I can happily report that my first Win11 Home installed sans a MSA
Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2026 15:24:16 -0500
Message-ID: <10k3l9g$2ug$1@nnrp.usenet.blueworldhosting.com>
On 1/21/2026 1:07 AM, Chris wrote:
Computers and the like are bulky and difficult to carry.
True story: My across the street neighbor lost all her electronics plus
other bulky items. How? Her car was broken into at work and the garage
door opener was taken. Her address was obtained from her car
registration which in my state is required to be in the car. They drove
to her address, opened the garage door, parked inside, and lowered the
door. Then they took their time loading the car knowing she was at work.
I'll admit a bit unusual but definitely clever...
Daniel70 wrote:
Chris wrote:A nice watch?
What house in any decent area doesn't have jewellery?
Mine .... but then, I don't have a Misses, either! ;-P
On 1/21/2026 1:07 AM, Chris wrote:
Computers and the like are bulky and difficult to carry.
True story: My across the street neighbor lost all her electronics plus
other bulky items. How? Her car was broken into at work and the garage
door opener was taken. Her address was obtained from her car
registration which in my state is required to be in the car. They drove
to her address, opened the garage door, parked inside, and lowered the
door. Then they took their time loading the car knowing she was at work.
I'll admit a bit unusual but definitely clever...
On Wed, 21 Jan 2026 09:18:58 -0700, AJL wrote:
On 1/21/2026 1:07 AM, Chris wrote:
Computers and the like are bulky and difficult to carry.
True story: My across the street neighbor lost all her electronics
plus other bulky items. How? Her car was broken into at work and
the garage door opener was taken. Her address was obtained from
her car registration which in my state is required to be in the
car. They drove to her address, opened the garage door, parked
inside, and lowered the door. Then they took their time loading the
car knowing she was at work. I'll admit a bit unusual but
definitely clever...
For that reason, it's important to lock the door into your house
from the garage.
On 21/01/2026 08:07, Chris wrote:
What house in any decent area doesn't have jewellery?
My house; but I don't live in a particularly nice area. In fact, I don't even own a house. A few years ago, I had a very serious accident that left me housebound. I lost my good job at a bank in London due to my situation, and my wife left me and took ownership of the house because the court decided that she had to look after the children as I was not physically able to do so.
Due to my physical state, I can't get a job now, so all I can do is depend on my local council to provide me with accommodation. I am lucky to have community fibre in my area, which provides me with free basic internet.
Daniel70 wrote:
Chris wrote:A nice watch?
What house in any decent area doesn't have jewellery?
Mine .... but then, I don't have a Misses, either! ;-P
household noises where they are.
On Wed, 21 Jan 2026 20:10:11 +0000, Andy Burns wrote:
Daniel70 wrote:
Chris wrote:A nice watch?
What house in any decent area doesn't have jewellery?
Mine .... but then, I don't have a Misses, either! ;-P
My watches aren't jewelry. They're for telling time.
Paul wrote:
[snip]
ÿIt's the same with some city employees, you can hear
household noises where they are.By contrast, if you can hear "office" noises then it's a spammer calling you ...
Frank Slootweg wrote:[My comments, suggestions and arguments deleted.]
What is your recommendation for privacy on a computer, Frank?
Brian Gregory wrote:
On 20/01/2026 20:43, Maria Sophia wrote:
Brian Gregory wrote:
Unless you're Jeffrey Epstein, they likely want the hardware, not
the data.
Duh! We're dealing entirely with unlikely situations here. My laptop
isn't stolen regularly, say about once every year.
Stolen laptops, from domestic homes are likely to be quickly sold
for drug money in some back alley to someone who will then have a
long time to go through their contents and work out how to use
anything interesting they find.
I'm making a philosophical point, which is who needs marketing gimmicks? >>>
I've never been 'burgled' but if I was, my passwords are in
KeepassXC, and
my financial data is in veracrypt containers, so all they get are my
pics.
Which is the key point, really...
We don't *need* silly marketing security (e.g., biometric gimmicks)
for a
home computer as long as we don't live in the slums... :)
You don't need to leave the blank checks in you checkbook (did I spell
it the correct way for you US types?) unsigned. But I bet you do.
If we live in the slums, then by all means, we need those silly
marketing
gimmicks, and, unfortunately, on iOS devices, the gimmicks are required.
Unlike in the USA, there don't seem to be many slums left in my country.
I have pictures of the children of relatives. They would be unhappy if
I said some random thief had these pictures and I totally understand
why, when you hear what paedophiles have been known to use them for,
or even just what Grok lets you do with them.
Hi Brian,
We can delve deeper into edge cases, but the main question was whether a
home user needs BIOS passwords on a Windows system. My view
is that BIOS passwords may not protect the data that actually matters.
Some important data on a typical Windows laptop that needs protection are passwords and financial or medical records which I focused upon, although pictures and anything else can be added into that category if you like.
Those are likely stored in encrypted containers if you use tools like Veracrypt and KeepassXC (although I'd have to check how to automate that
for photos). While that is partial encryption, not full disk encryption, my observation is that it may be enough for most home users because the sensitive material is isolated without having to enter a password (or biometric marketing gimmicks) constantly, every day of the year.
A BIOS password does not protect any of that (AFAIK). A thief can remove
the drive and read it. Biometrics do not protect it either. They only
unlock the Windows session. Once the drive is out of the laptop, the biometric layer is irrelevant (AFAIK).
So my practical Windows security model for a home environment is this:
1. Encrypt the small amount of data that actually matters, such as
passwords and financial records.
2. Keep that data in Veracrypt containers or a password manager.
3. Do not rely on BIOS passwords or biometrics to protect data on a
stolen device because they do not address that threat.
Biometric marketing gimmicks solve a convenience problem, not a data protection problem. If we have a real fear of the people around us, that is
a different threat model, but most home users do not need that level of control (IMHO) in terms of the frequency of passwords they enter.
On 21/01/2026 18:32, Maria Sophia wrote:
So my practical Windows security model for a home environment is this:
1. Encrypt the small amount of data that actually matters, such as
passwords and financial records.
2. Keep that data in Veracrypt containers or a password manager.
3. Do not rely on BIOS passwords or biometrics to protect data on a
stolen device because they do not address that threat.
Biometric marketing gimmicks solve a convenience problem, not a data
protection problem. If we have a real fear of the people around us, that is >> a different threat model, but most home users do not need that level of
control (IMHO) in terms of the frequency of passwords they enter.
But it's unrealistic to expect anyone but an expert to install and use Veracrypt containers, it's also largely unrealistic to expect them to
keep absolutely everything always in it's designated place, encrypted or unencrypted as appropriate.
I get that BIOS password doesn't add any real protection but why object
to it so much? It's another thing that any hacker will need to get
around before they can run any hacking tool on a PC.
I also do not see why you regard biometric security as a gimmick. It's
dirt cheap now (cost me œ12 to add a fingerprint reader to my desktop
PC) and works fairly well, and seems to err firmly towards rejecting
fingers that don't match exactly rather than accepting anything vaguely
like my finger. On cold days I even need to warm my finger before
there's any hope of it matching how it looked to the scanner on a hot day.
Frank Slootweg wrote:[...]
What is your recommendation for privacy on a computer, Frank?
To answer your question: You probably mean measures to limit the consequences of bad actors having physical access to your (Windows) computer or stealing it, as that's the context of this thread. "privacy
on a computer" is *way* too wide/unspecific/ambiguous/<whatever>.
You are correct. We're assuming a daily boot of a Windows PC with a local account (whether Windows 11 or Windows 10) and people you trust in the home and we're assuming the rare happenstance of a burglar with physical access.
Note: Windows FDE is Bitlocker, so that is the default interpretation.
That said, my - rather obvious - recommendations are: A boot password, sign-in protection (password or/and other) and - if needed/practical - Windows' FDE or similar.
Thank you for outlining your model to contrast with mine, where we each optimized the threat protection in reasonably different manners.
I. Frank's proposed security model is system centric & labor intensive.
II. The model I suggest is data centric & optimized for convenience.
Since the goal is for others to learn from our technical conversation
here is a point-by-point summary of the two threat models we proposed.
A. Threat model
1. FS assumes OS level FDE (Bitlocker) protection is required.
2. MS assume only specific data stores need protection.
B. Boot process
1. FS uses a boot password and sign in protection.
2. MS uses no boot password and no sign in password.
C. Disk protection
1. FS uses Windows FDE so the entire volume is encrypted at rest.
2. MS uses Veracrypt for financial data & KeePassDX for passwords.
D. Forensic residue
1. FS's model encrypts swap, temp files, hibernation files & caches.
2. MS's model protects encrypted containers leaving OS residue readable.
E. Convenience
1. FS accepts daily friction at boot & sign in.
2. MS eliminates friction at boot & sign in by only unlocking
containers when needed (which the user may unlock only occasionally).
F. Cloud identity
1. FS's model can run without a Microsoft account but if Windows FDE
is used then recovery material must be stored offline by the user.
2. MS's model uses no OS level encryption so no recovery keys exist
and no cloud identity is ever needed at any time (by design).
G. Physical theft
1. FS's model forces the attacker to defeat FDE for all access.
2. MS's model exposes OS data but protects financial & passwd data.
H. Family access
1. FS's model blocks family members without credentials.
2. MS's model allows family access but keeps sensitive data encrypted.
Summary
1. FS's model maximizes system level protection & minimizes leakage.
But at the cost of daily convenience.
2. Ms's model maximizes daily convenience by protecting data chosen
to encrypt (which the user may unlock only occasionally).
--
On Usenet, old men discuss topics that they've thought about for decades.
On 22/01/2026 7:10 am, Andy Burns wrote:
Daniel70 wrote:Who needs a Watch .... when I've got my 'phone'?? ;-P
Chris wrote:A nice watch?
What house in any decent area doesn't have jewellery?
Mine .... but then, I don't have a Misses, either! ;-P
Paul wrote:
[snip]
It's the same with some city employees, you can hear
household noises where they are.By contrast, if you can hear "office" noises then it's a spammer calling
you ...
On 2026/1/22 8:55:19, Daniel70 wrote:
On 22/01/2026 7:10 am, Andy Burns wrote:
Daniel70 wrote:Who needs a Watch .... when I've got my 'phone'?? ;-P
Chris wrote:A nice watch?
What house in any decent area doesn't have jewellery?
Mine .... but then, I don't have a Misses, either! ;-P
I can glance at my wrist (cheap blue plastic CASIO - had it for years)
far more quickly than I could at a 'phone, if I had one (and both my
hands are free, too).
Plus, if I _had_ a smartphone, I'd presumably
mostly be doing something with it (if not, why have one?), so would have
to change/minimise to see the clock (or peer at tiny digits along the
edge of the display).
Hi Frank,[...]
This discussion is welcome because it compares very different use models.
My usage pattern is different from yours perhaps because my hardware is
from 2009 and does not wake reliably from sleep or hibernation, so daily shutdown is normal for me.
About recovery keys, AFAIK, Device Encryption may not require the user to store one manually, but it still ties recovery to Microsoft infrastructure unless the user intervenes by taking deliberate steps to prevent the
default behavior. My approach avoids that by not using OS level encryption.
AFAIK, Windows Device Encryption on Home automatically backs up the
recovery key to the user's Microsoft account unless the user actively stops it. That default behavior is what ties recovery to Microsoft
infrastructure.
The passwords for my encrypted containers are stored in KeePassDX inside
an encrypted database that is backed up offline. So the container keys
are not tied to a cloud identity. The only passwd I need to know is that to the KeepassDX database, but in general, I remember my encrypted volume passwords so I don't need to access the backup inside the keepass db.
Given what we've compared I agree that neither model is universally better since mine is designed for minimum friction and yours is designed for a far greater threat model than I feel at my home in the Santa Cruz Mountains.
I'm sure a burglary happens where I live, but I have no experience with it and I don't need to add a dozen locks to my doors that have to be opened
all day, every day. I prefer simply to lock the shed where I keep my tools, and then, once a week or so, I can go to the trouble to unlock it then.
Both approaches are valid depending on hardware age, habits and
tolerance for friction. I have no tolerance for extra steps.
--
If it takes two steps to do something on a computer, cut it in half.
I moved into this house about Ten years ago and, for some reason or
other, the Phone Landline socket is positioned on the far wall of the
main bedroom.
I don't know about you but I don't spend much time in my Bedroom ....
except when I'm sleeping .... so, after rushing from the Loungeroom to
the Bedroom when the phone rang .... only to find it was a Spammer
calling, I brought myself a Cordless phone with Answer machine built
into the Base station .... so, if the phone rings, I let the Answer
machine do its job .... and, usually, by the time the Answer machines Welcome message has finished, the caller has hung up.
Job Done!! ;-P
Maria Sophia <mariasophia@comprehension.com> wrote:
AFAIK, Windows Device Encryption on Home automatically backs up the
recovery key to the user's Microsoft account unless the user actively stops >> it. That default behavior is what ties recovery to Microsoft
infrastructure.
Windows Device Encryption also works with a local account. I only have
a local account and don't have a Microsoft Account. I believe the key is stored in the machine's BIOS or similar, hence my comment on saving the
key somewhere locally in case the machine has a fatal hardware failure.
On biometrics, a key point is that they do not protect data at rest.
A fingerprint or face scan unlocks the Windows session, but once the
drive is removed from the laptop the biometric layer is irrelevant. The
data on the drive is readable unless it is encrypted. Biometrics solve a convenience problem for sign in, not a data protection problem for a
stolen device. That is why I treat them more as a marketing gimmick rather than a security control for data at rest.
My model is simple and well thought out to be optimized for convenience.
1. Encrypt the small amount of data that matters.
2. Keep it in Veracrypt containers or a password manager.
3. Do not rely on BIOS passwords or biometrics for data at rest.
4. Optimize for convenience during daily use.
On 22/01/2026 15:59, Maria Sophia wrote:[...]
My model is simple and well thought out to be optimized for convenience.
1. Encrypt the small amount of data that matters.
2. Keep it in Veracrypt containers or a password manager.
3. Do not rely on BIOS passwords or biometrics for data at rest.
4. Optimize for convenience during daily use.
My BIOS password is just another small obstacle in the path of a bad actor.
Having been in the Army, where you could get into trouble for not being
where you are supposed to be WHEN you are supposed to be there .... so I usually have my Car clock set three to five minutes fast .... you know.
just in case!! (even having been out of the Army over thirty years)
I have a (corded, as it happens) 'phone at my elbow, so answer almost immediately (startles some callers!); however, especially around 10:30am which seems to be peak phishtime, I don't actually _say_ anything for a
few seconds; the same applies - the autodialler (or whatever) gives up.
(A real caller will usually say something in that time.)
On Fri, 23 Jan 2026 20:17:11 +1100, Daniel70 wrote:
[snip]
Having been in the Army, where you could get into trouble for not being
where you are supposed to be WHEN you are supposed to be there .... so I
usually have my Car clock set three to five minutes fast .... you know.
just in case!! (even having been out of the Army over thirty years)
I used to know someone who did that. I'd rather set my watch RIGHT and do
my own thinking, and leave on time.
BTW, I get tired of hearing "fast" and "slow" used improperly, when the problem has nothing to do with speed.
On Fri, 23 Jan 2026 20:17:11 +1100, Daniel70 wrote:
[snip]
Having been in the Army, where you could get into trouble for not being
where you are supposed to be WHEN you are supposed to be there .... so I
usually have my Car clock set three to five minutes fast .... you know.
just in case!! (even having been out of the Army over thirty years)
I used to know someone who did that. I'd rather set my watch RIGHT and do
my own thinking, and leave on time.
BTW, I get tired of hearing "fast" and "slow" used improperly, when the problem has nothing to do with speed.
On Fri, 23 Jan 2026 16:09:08 +0000, J. P. Gilliver wrote:
[snip]
I have a (corded, as it happens) 'phone at my elbow, so answer almost
immediately (startles some callers!); however, especially around 10:30am
which seems to be peak phishtime, I don't actually _say_ anything for a
few seconds; the same applies - the autodialler (or whatever) gives up.
(A real caller will usually say something in that time.)
I often hang up after saying "hello" twice with no response, unless it's someone I know who often does that.
I got a call this morning that I didn't answer because of multiple signs
of it being a machine.
1. The NAME* appearing on caller ID was identical to the number.
2. The caller did leave a message, but it was "beginning truncated" (the first few seconds of the message were missing, like the machine was too stupid to WAIT FOR THE BEEP). What I heard first was "(half a word) in
your area".
3. The call ended with a few seconds of busy signal, which I hear
indicates the call was not disconnected properly (it doesn't happen on legitimate calls).
* - a feature that I really wish that mobile phones would have. It can be used to detect and ignore most junk calls.
On 22/01/2026 15:59, Maria Sophia wrote:
On biometrics, a key point is that they do not protect data at rest.
A fingerprint or face scan unlocks the Windows session, but once the
drive is removed from the laptop the biometric layer is irrelevant. The
data on the drive is readable unless it is encrypted. Biometrics solve a
convenience problem for sign in, not a data protection problem for a
stolen device. That is why I treat them more as a marketing gimmick rather >> than a security control for data at rest.
Obviously biometrics are not something you add to add protection.
They simply avoid you having to type a password or PIN.
There is the frequency adjustment of the reference oscillator,
to avoid first order drift. On typical time pieces, this runs at
32768.0000 Hz (above human hearing).
A watchmaker may have a suitable
instrument while working to correct the value.
A trimmer capacitor is inside the watch, to make tweaks.
The RTC in a personal computer is missing this adjustment.
And there is the purposeful register offset, to arrive at destinations
ahead of an appointment. The register could be adjusted ahead, behind,
or nominal.
"I set my watch ahead, so I will always be on time for
appointments"
[well, not absolutely always, depends on paragraph 1]
Good time pieces are temperature compensated, as the ambient temperature changes, the tempco of some of the elements are made to cancel, and it
gives the impression the device is temperature invariant (which it is
not). Scientific American used to have articles about this, in the
Amateur Scientist section.
Some cars have had excellent temperature compensated time clock pieces.
On 2026/1/23 19:19:40, Mark Lloyd wrote:
On Fri, 23 Jan 2026 16:09:08 +0000, J. P. Gilliver wrote:I've never seen a landline 'phone that displays a NAME - other than ones where YOU can program in (to the handset or the basestation) names that
[snip]
I have a (corded, as it happens) 'phone at my elbow, so answer almost
immediately (startles some callers!); however, especially around
10:30am which seems to be peak phishtime, I don't actually _say_
anything for a few seconds; the same applies - the autodialler (or
whatever) gives up. (A real caller will usually say something in that
time.)
I often hang up after saying "hello" twice with no response, unless
it's someone I know who often does that.
I got a call this morning that I didn't answer because of multiple
signs of it being a machine.
1. The NAME* appearing on caller ID was identical to the number.
2. The caller did leave a message, but it was "beginning truncated"
(the first few seconds of the message were missing, like the machine
was too stupid to WAIT FOR THE BEEP). What I heard first was "(half a
word) in your area".
3. The call ended with a few seconds of busy signal, which I hear
indicates the call was not disconnected properly (it doesn't happen on
legitimate calls).
* - a feature that I really wish that mobile phones would have. It can
be used to detect and ignore most junk calls.
YOU associate with certain numbers.
On Sat, 24 Jan 2026 00:16:33 +0000, J. P. Gilliver wrote:
I've never seen a landline 'phone that displays a NAME - other than ones
where YOU can program in (to the handset or the basestation) names that
YOU associate with certain numbers.
AFAIK, all landline systems have it now (although I don't know about wireless home phone service from a cell company). Older phones will
require a separate display device. For a long time I've used cordless
phones with the CID display (both name and number) built-in.
BTW, most of the ones (separate CID displays) I had used a reflective LCD display with no backlight. These were hard to read unless you get the
angle just right.
For junk calls, many show 1 of these 2 patterns in the name display:
1. CITY ST (like TELEPHONE TX). I hear that that's what happens when the number is not registered, and it's trying to tell you where the call is coming from. This is most likely useless when you're dealing with spoofed numbers, but the pattern usually does identify a robocall.
2. The NAME field has just a number in it, often the same as the number field.
BTW, there really is a TELEPHONE TX. It's a little town which probably has nothing to do with the spammer.
OT: We had a little snow last night.
On Sat, 24 Jan 2026 00:16:33 +0000, J. P. Gilliver wrote:
I've never seen a landline 'phone that displays a NAME - other than ones
where YOU can program in (to the handset or the basestation) names that
YOU associate with certain numbers.
AFAIK, all landline systems have it now (although I don't know about
wireless home phone service from a cell company). Older phones will
require a separate display device. For a long time I've used cordless
phones with the CID display (both name and number) built-in.
BTW, most of the ones (separate CID displays) I had used a reflective LCD display with no backlight. These were hard to read unless you get the
angle just right.
Windows Home Device Encryption when enabled
ÿ - first looks to store the key in the MSFT account that was initially
used to setup(first use) the device even if that MSFT account was
switched to a local logon. If not setup with a MSFT account or MSFT
account no longer present on device, the only options for the user to
obtain the key are - Save to USB, copy to paper, copy and save to text
file.
ÿ - the key itself for validation purposes is stored on the device, but
not in readable or accessible form.
Thanks for the clarification. I was researching this in a response for Paul just now in the bitlocker thread (where MS handed the keys to LE), where we need to pin down the distinction between Device Encryption on Home and full BitLocker on Pro with respect to where we "can" store the encryption keys.
AFAIK...
i. Windows Home does not include full BitLocker. It includes Device
ÿ Encryption, which is a limited version with almost no user control.
v. The recent reports about Microsoft providing recovery keys to law
ÿ enforcement involved keys stored in Microsoft accounts. That perhaps
ÿ most applies to default Device Encryption on Home, and maybe not ÿ so much to BitLocker on Pro when configured with local-only protectors.
In summary, I think that Windows Home users do not have the same kind of control over key storage that Windows Pro users have.
That is why the default workflow on Home ends up with theIt does not(for Windows Home)
recovery key in a Microsoft account in most cases.
...w???ÿ wrote:You'll have to get the choir to discuss that..it's not a popular tool in
In summary, I think that Windows Home users do not have the same kind of >>> control over key storage that Windows Pro users have.
At least, you're getting closer to the entire picture(Bitlocker
Encryption is fully supported on Enterprise and Edu editions, too)
Thanks for the clarification, where I just opened a separate thread on why, in my case of an older machine, and for consistency & greater protection
even on current Windows 11 Home versus Pro machines, Veracrypt has some decisive FDE advantages over anything Microsoft marketing has provided us.
Subject: PSA: Veracrypt has pre boot authentication (& why it's better
Maria Sophia wrote on 1/24/2026 8:17 PM:
...w???ÿ wrote:You'll have to get the choir to discuss that..it's not a popular tool in the Enterprise/Edu/Gov community where encryption has wider use and preference.ÿ Some might even consider it(Veracrypt) old, unreliable and late to the party on updating, no official tech support, and UI design-wise inadequate/cumbersome/dysfunctional.
In summary, I think that Windows Home users do not have the same kind of >>>> control over key storage that Windows Pro users have.
At least, you're getting closer to the entire picture(Bitlocker Encryption is fully supported on Enterprise and Edu editions, too)
Thanks for the clarification, where I just opened a separate thread on why, >> in my case of an older machine, and for consistency & greater protection
even on current Windows 11 Home versus Pro machines, Veracrypt has some
decisive FDE advantages over anything Microsoft marketing has provided us. >>
Subject: PSA: Veracrypt has pre boot authentication (& why it's better
...w¤?ñ?¤
Maria Sophia wrote on 1/24/2026 8:17 PM:
...w???ÿ wrote:You'll have to get the choir to discuss that..it's not a popular tool in
In summary, I think that Windows Home users do not have the same kind of >>>> control over key storage that Windows Pro users have.
At least, you're getting closer to the entire picture(Bitlocker
Encryption is fully supported on Enterprise and Edu editions, too)
Thanks for the clarification, where I just opened a separate thread on why, >> in my case of an older machine, and for consistency & greater protection
even on current Windows 11 Home versus Pro machines, Veracrypt has some
decisive FDE advantages over anything Microsoft marketing has provided us. >>
Subject: PSA: Veracrypt has pre boot authentication (& why it's better
the Enterprise/Edu/Gov community where encryption has wider use and preference. Some might even consider it(Veracrypt) old, unreliable and
late to the party on updating, no official tech support, and UI
design-wise inadequate/cumbersome/dysfunctional.
| Sysop: | Jacob Catayoc |
|---|---|
| Location: | Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines |
| Users: | 5 |
| Nodes: | 4 (0 / 4) |
| Uptime: | 24:11:05 |
| Calls: | 117 |
| Calls today: | 117 |
| Files: | 368 |
| D/L today: |
560 files (257M bytes) |
| Messages: | 70,913 |
| Posted today: | 26 |