In cloud storage, zero-knowledge encryption is a privacy
model where the provider does not hold the key needed to
decrypt customer's protected data.
What Is End-to-End Encryption?
End-to-end encryption protects content from the moment
it leaves an authorized device until it reaches the
intended recipient's device.
This is different from ordinary encryption at rest.
Encryption at rest protects files on a server, but the
provider may still control the keys that unlock them.
This is stronger than ordinary encryption in transit.
End-to-end encryption does not remove every security
responsibility.
Perhaps you should contact the website and let them know your thoughts?
<https://cloudbasedbackup.com/en/blog/zero-knowledge-encryption-vs-end-to-end-encryption-whats-the-difference>
Would you always trust the end-to-end security of popular messaging apps,
or would you prefer to allow end users to manage it themselves?
Hermes,
or would you prefer to allow end users to manage it themselves?
How ?
And mind you, you said "messaging apps", not email where you create the message in a text-editor, than encypt it, and than add the resulting file as an attachment. Thats much to cumbersome - especially on a smartphone.
iow, if you offer the raw text to the messaging app you already have to
trust that the app will not MITM the conversation or also send a duplicate
to the message-apps company (or elsewhere).
MicroCrypt is a multi-purpose symmetric encryption app for mobile and desktop.
Users only need to exchange their password out of band,
and then they can simply copy and paste the encrypted message
into any mobile or desktop app.
It's so easy to use that even Granny Smith can use it with her grandchildren.
iow, if you offer the raw text to the messaging app you already have to
trust that the app will not MITM the conversation or also send a
duplicate
to the message-apps company (or elsewhere).
Can the app, on install, create automatically an encryption key that only exists on the app?
Then send the public part to the server, so that any client can download
the public key of anyone they want to message.
All clients would do the same.
The private key, only exists on the client.
Just as PGP in email, but automatic. Would that work?
Carlos,
iow, if you offer the raw text to the messaging app you already have to
trust that the app will not MITM the conversation or also send a
duplicate
to the message-apps company (or elsewhere).
Can the app, on install, create automatically an encryption key that only
exists on the app?
Than *you already trust the app* not to do either of what I mentioned, and you quoted, in the above.
Then send the public part to the server, so that any client can download
the public key of anyone they want to message.
A messaging app could use *a* public key, not necessarily that of the intended receipient. Can you view the public key use by the app for the current E2E message ? If not ....
... and even if you can that doesn't mean that that is the key thats used
...
Yes, there is a LOT of trust for the app involved. :-( :-)
All clients would do the same.
The private key, only exists on the client.
Just as PGP in email, but automatic. Would that work?
Only if you trust the messaging-app not to pull a fast one - again, see what you quoted.
Regards,
Rudy Wieser
Lets go thru the steps, shall we ?
Sure!
1) Open MicroCrypt.
2) Paste the received message, then decrypt and edit it in MicroCrypt.
3) Finish editing, then encrypt and copy/paste the message into your
messenger or email app.
Than *you already trust the app* not to do either of what I mentioned,
and
you quoted, in the above.
Use open source.
Yes, there is a LOT of trust for the app involved. :-( :-)
Again, use open source.
Carlos,
Than *you already trust the app* not to do either of what I mentioned,
and
you quoted, in the above.
Use open source.
"open source" is not a magical solve-all incantation. Most people use open source in a pre-compiled form. Its better, but still far from perfect.
Yes, there is a LOT of trust for the app involved. :-( :-)
Again, use open source.
It doesn't change the "lots of trust for the involved" problem.
Unless you grab yourself the sourcecode, read *and understand* the whole thing and than compile it on your own machine you still trust others to have done their work in this regard too
ref: the offered "walled gardens", where a number bad apps have been found where the developpers where unaware - caught-out by poisonned
libraries.
Source being available still means inspection is possible,
whereas with closed source you really don't have much of an
option other than blindly trust (although, yes, reverse
engineering is possible).
You either trust the application or then you have to trust the OS to
provide some sort of unhijackable interface for encrypted messaging,
for example, if the system could have a messaging interface
application, one or several messaging providers (SMS, E-mail,
XMPP, ...) and a separate optional encryption layer.
(and herein lies a disadvantage, because not all media are equal,
compare the SMS message length and text encoding needs with
electronic mail, but OTOH we've had messaging apps supporting at
least SMS and MMS).
Another disadvantage, of course, is the SPOF which could then
be attacked, by having e.g. manufacturers installing backdoored
messaging systems...
...Symmetric ? That to me means its disqualified.
Asymmetric encryption solves key distribution problem,
nothing else.
| Sysop: | Jacob Catayoc |
|---|---|
| Location: | Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines |
| Users: | 4 |
| Nodes: | 4 (0 / 4) |
| Uptime: | 497101:38:37 |
| Calls: | 182 |
| Files: | 744 |
| D/L today: |
59 files (9,737K bytes) |
| Messages: | 73,617 |