Stefan Ram <ram@zedat.fu-berlin.de> wrote:

| Samuel Tunick's landmark federal prosecution marks the first known
| U.S. case where an individual faces criminal felony charges specifi-
| cally for using a software-built "duress passcode" to wipe a phone's
| data during a border search.
|
| The case heavily intersects digital privacy rights, activism, and the
| scope of government power at international borders.
|
| The Incident and the Software
|
| The Detainment In January 2025, Tunick - an Atlanta-based activist -
| was pulled into a secondary inspection room by Customs and Border
| Protection (CBP) agents at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International
| Airport after returning from a vacation in the Dominican Republic.
|
| The Software Feature Tunick's Google Pixel was running GrapheneOS,
| a privacy-hardened, open-source Android operating system. The OS fea-
| tures a duress password mechanism. If an alternative, pre-configured
| passcode is entered under coercion, the device immediately deletes
| its cryptographic keys and executes an irreversible, factory-reset
| data wipe without confirmation screens.
|
| The Trigger When CBP agents demanded his passcode, Tunick provided
| the duress PIN. Officers entered the code themselves, causing the
| phone screen to go blank, flash, and completely erase its digital
| contents.
|
| The Federal Charges
|
| The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) indicted Tunick under 18 U.S.C. ?
| 2232(a).
|
| - This federal statute prohibits the destruction or damage of property
| to prevent its lawful seizure by authorities.
|
| - Traditionally applied to physical evidence (such as discarding drugs
| or weapons during a raid), prosecutors are treating the
| software-driven data wipe as equivalent to destroying physical
| evidence.
|
| - Tunick has pleaded not guilty and faces up to five years in federal
| prison if convicted.
|
| Legal Arguments & Precedent
|
| The case has sparked major concerns among digital civil liberties
| groups, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), because it
| targets built-in device privacy features.
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------
| Position Core Arguments
| ------------------------- ----------------------------------
| Federal Prosecutors - Border searches do not require a
| warrant under the "border search
| exception" to the Fourth
| Amendment.
|
| - The physical phone is
| a container, but the data itself
| is seizable property.
|
| - Intentionally activating a wipe
| code constitutes a deliberate
| obstruction of a lawful search.
|
| Tunick's Defense Team - The search was an unlawful,
| warrantless "fishing expedition"
| using a pretextual warning about
| child exploitation material to
| investigate Tunick's political
| ties to Atlanta's "Stop Cop City"
| movement.
|
| - Agents allegedly denied Tunick's
| requests for a lawyer and failed
| to read him his Miranda rights.
|
| - A motion to suppress the now-empty
| phone as evidence has been filed.
|
| Current Status
|
| A federal judge in Atlanta is expected to rule on the defense's motion
| to suppress evidence. If the judge allows the case to move forward, a
| trial could begin in the final months of the year, potentially
| establishing a major legal precedent for mobile encryption and border
| surveillance boundaries.

Lines marked with "| " come from my editing, where I start by writing
prompts for the chatbot and then edit the generated texts and format
them for USENET.

I thought in the US you had a constitutional right to not provide a
password if you didn't want to. He didn't need to go to this effort.

Also, surely his defence is that he didn't want his phone stolen and all
his data at risk when in DR so he set this up. Due to the emotional trauma
of being arrested he panicked and gave the "wrong" PIN. It was an accident
as a good citizen he wanted to comply despite his constitutional right to
not provide anything.


--- PyGate Linux v1.5.19
* Origin: Dragon's Lair, PyGate NNTP<>Fido Gate (3:633/10)

On 30.07.26 14:30, Chris wrote:

Stefan Ram <ram@zedat.fu-berlin.de> wrote:

| Samuel Tunick's landmark federal prosecution marks the first known
| U.S. case where an individual faces criminal felony charges specifi-
| cally for using a software-built "duress passcode" to wipe a phone's
| data during a border search.
|
| The case heavily intersects digital privacy rights, activism, and the
| scope of government power at international borders.
|
| The Incident and the Software
|
| The Detainment In January 2025, Tunick - an Atlanta-based activist -
| was pulled into a secondary inspection room by Customs and Border
| Protection (CBP) agents at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International
| Airport after returning from a vacation in the Dominican Republic.
|
| The Software Feature Tunick's Google Pixel was running GrapheneOS,
| a privacy-hardened, open-source Android operating system. The OS fea-
| tures a duress password mechanism. If an alternative, pre-configured
| passcode is entered under coercion, the device immediately deletes
| its cryptographic keys and executes an irreversible, factory-reset
| data wipe without confirmation screens.
|
| The Trigger When CBP agents demanded his passcode, Tunick provided
| the duress PIN. Officers entered the code themselves, causing the
| phone screen to go blank, flash, and completely erase its digital
| contents.
|
| The Federal Charges
|
| The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) indicted Tunick under 18 U.S.C. ?
| 2232(a).
|
| - This federal statute prohibits the destruction or damage of property
| to prevent its lawful seizure by authorities.
|
| - Traditionally applied to physical evidence (such as discarding drugs
| or weapons during a raid), prosecutors are treating the
| software-driven data wipe as equivalent to destroying physical
| evidence.
|
| - Tunick has pleaded not guilty and faces up to five years in federal
| prison if convicted.
|
| Legal Arguments & Precedent
|
| The case has sparked major concerns among digital civil liberties
| groups, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), because it
| targets built-in device privacy features.
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------
| Position Core Arguments
| ------------------------- ----------------------------------
| Federal Prosecutors - Border searches do not require a
| warrant under the "border search
| exception" to the Fourth
| Amendment.
|
| - The physical phone is
| a container, but the data itself
| is seizable property.
|
| - Intentionally activating a wipe
| code constitutes a deliberate
| obstruction of a lawful search.
|
| Tunick's Defense Team - The search was an unlawful,
| warrantless "fishing expedition"
| using a pretextual warning about
| child exploitation material to
| investigate Tunick's political
| ties to Atlanta's "Stop Cop City"
| movement.
|
| - Agents allegedly denied Tunick's
| requests for a lawyer and failed
| to read him his Miranda rights.
|
| - A motion to suppress the now-empty
| phone as evidence has been filed.
|
| Current Status
|
| A federal judge in Atlanta is expected to rule on the defense's motion
| to suppress evidence. If the judge allows the case to move forward, a
| trial could begin in the final months of the year, potentially
| establishing a major legal precedent for mobile encryption and border
| surveillance boundaries.

Lines marked with "| " come from my editing, where I start by writing
prompts for the chatbot and then edit the generated texts and format
them for USENET.

I thought in the US you had a constitutional right to not provide a
password if you didn't want to. He didn't need to go to this effort.

Legally this person was not within the US borders.
At least border control claims that.


--
"Roma locuta, causa finita" (Augustinus)

--- PyGate Linux v1.5.19
* Origin: Dragon's Lair, PyGate NNTP<>Fido Gate (3:633/10)

On 2026-07-30, J”rg Lorenz wrote:

On 30.07.26 14:30, Chris wrote:

Stefan Ram <ram@zedat.fu-berlin.de> wrote:

| Samuel Tunick's landmark federal prosecution marks the first known
| U.S. case where an individual faces criminal felony charges specifi-
| cally for using a software-built "duress passcode" to wipe a phone's
| data during a border search.
|
| The case heavily intersects digital privacy rights, activism, and the
| scope of government power at international borders.
|
| The Incident and the Software
|
| The Detainment In January 2025, Tunick - an Atlanta-based activist - >>> | was pulled into a secondary inspection room by Customs and Border
| Protection (CBP) agents at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International
| Airport after returning from a vacation in the Dominican Republic.
|
| The Software Feature Tunick's Google Pixel was running GrapheneOS,
| a privacy-hardened, open-source Android operating system. The OS fea-
| tures a duress password mechanism. If an alternative, pre-configured
| passcode is entered under coercion, the device immediately deletes
| its cryptographic keys and executes an irreversible, factory-reset
| data wipe without confirmation screens.
|
| The Trigger When CBP agents demanded his passcode, Tunick provided
| the duress PIN. Officers entered the code themselves, causing the
| phone screen to go blank, flash, and completely erase its digital
| contents.
|
| The Federal Charges
|
| The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) indicted Tunick under 18 U.S.C. ? >>> | 2232(a).
|
| - This federal statute prohibits the destruction or damage of property >>> | to prevent its lawful seizure by authorities.
|
| - Traditionally applied to physical evidence (such as discarding drugs >>> | or weapons during a raid), prosecutors are treating the
| software-driven data wipe as equivalent to destroying physical
| evidence.
|
| - Tunick has pleaded not guilty and faces up to five years in federal
| prison if convicted.
|
| Legal Arguments & Precedent
|
| The case has sparked major concerns among digital civil liberties
| groups, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), because it
| targets built-in device privacy features.
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------
| Position Core Arguments
| ------------------------- ----------------------------------
| Federal Prosecutors - Border searches do not require a
| warrant under the "border search
| exception" to the Fourth
| Amendment.
|
| - The physical phone is
| a container, but the data itself
| is seizable property.
|
| - Intentionally activating a wipe
| code constitutes a deliberate
| obstruction of a lawful search.
|
| Tunick's Defense Team - The search was an unlawful,
| warrantless "fishing expedition"
| using a pretextual warning about
| child exploitation material to
| investigate Tunick's political
| ties to Atlanta's "Stop Cop City"
| movement.
|
| - Agents allegedly denied Tunick's
| requests for a lawyer and failed
| to read him his Miranda rights.
|
| - A motion to suppress the now-empty
| phone as evidence has been filed.
|
| Current Status
|
| A federal judge in Atlanta is expected to rule on the defense's motion >>> | to suppress evidence. If the judge allows the case to move forward, a
| trial could begin in the final months of the year, potentially
| establishing a major legal precedent for mobile encryption and border
| surveillance boundaries.

Lines marked with "| " come from my editing, where I start by writing
prompts for the chatbot and then edit the generated texts and format
them for USENET.

I thought in the US you had a constitutional right to not provide a
password if you didn't want to. He didn't need to go to this effort.

Legally this person was not within the US borders.
At least border control claims that.

Then their claims surely are void? They don't get to both claim US
jurisdiction for filing the charges and claim its absence for waiving
the rights, or do they? Am I walking into a montage of frames of Natalie Portman next to Hayden Christensen?

Of course they could still do something else regarding the resident
alient status... which does make me wonder why did they fill the
charges. Did some court already establish they can't attack residents
without this kind of legal action?

(If data itself is "seizable *property*", now that also ought to have implications regarding the DMCA and the validity of EULAs in the US...)

--
Nuno Silva

--- PyGate Linux v1.5.19
* Origin: Dragon's Lair, PyGate NNTP<>Fido Gate (3:633/10)

In comp.mobile.android, Nuno Silva <nunojsilva@invalid.invalid> wrote:

On 2026-07-30, J”rg Lorenz wrote:

Legally this person was not within the US borders.
At least border control claims that.

Then their claims surely are void? They don't get to both claim US jurisdiction for filing the charges and claim its absence for waiving
the rights, or do they? Am I walking into a montage of frames of Natalie Portman next to Hayden Christensen?

They charged him with destruction of property to be seized, right?
That's what I read in this one paragraph grand jury finding:

https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.351975/gov.uscourts.gand.351975.1.0.pdf

I expect Customs has a long (if thin) history of attempting to seize
contraband at the border and the would-be smuggler attempting (and
sometimes succeeding) in destroying the contraband before it can be
seized.

I don't think that is a controversial law.

What's controversial is considering the bits of data on his phone, not
merely the physical thing, as "property" that can be destroyed.

If you want to argue imaginary fairy cases, please don't make it seem
like you are talking about actual ones.

Elijah
------
reminded of so many imaginary fairy cases on slashdot

--- PyGate Linux v1.5.19
* Origin: Dragon's Lair, PyGate NNTP<>Fido Gate (3:633/10)

J”rg Lorenz <hugybear@gmx.net> wrote:

On 30.07.26 14:30, Chris wrote:

Stefan Ram <ram@zedat.fu-berlin.de> wrote:

| Samuel Tunick's landmark federal prosecution marks the first known
| U.S. case where an individual faces criminal felony charges specifi-
| cally for using a software-built "duress passcode" to wipe a phone's
| data during a border search.
|
| The case heavily intersects digital privacy rights, activism, and the
| scope of government power at international borders.
|
| The Incident and the Software
|
| The Detainment In January 2025, Tunick - an Atlanta-based activist - >>> | was pulled into a secondary inspection room by Customs and Border
| Protection (CBP) agents at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International
| Airport after returning from a vacation in the Dominican Republic.
|
| The Software Feature Tunick's Google Pixel was running GrapheneOS,
| a privacy-hardened, open-source Android operating system. The OS fea-
| tures a duress password mechanism. If an alternative, pre-configured
| passcode is entered under coercion, the device immediately deletes
| its cryptographic keys and executes an irreversible, factory-reset
| data wipe without confirmation screens.
|
| The Trigger When CBP agents demanded his passcode, Tunick provided
| the duress PIN. Officers entered the code themselves, causing the
| phone screen to go blank, flash, and completely erase its digital
| contents.
|
| The Federal Charges
|
| The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) indicted Tunick under 18 U.S.C. ? >>> | 2232(a).
|
| - This federal statute prohibits the destruction or damage of property >>> | to prevent its lawful seizure by authorities.
|
| - Traditionally applied to physical evidence (such as discarding drugs >>> | or weapons during a raid), prosecutors are treating the
| software-driven data wipe as equivalent to destroying physical
| evidence.
|
| - Tunick has pleaded not guilty and faces up to five years in federal
| prison if convicted.
|
| Legal Arguments & Precedent
|
| The case has sparked major concerns among digital civil liberties
| groups, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), because it
| targets built-in device privacy features.
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------
| Position Core Arguments
| ------------------------- ----------------------------------
| Federal Prosecutors - Border searches do not require a
| warrant under the "border search
| exception" to the Fourth
| Amendment.
|
| - The physical phone is
| a container, but the data itself
| is seizable property.
|
| - Intentionally activating a wipe
| code constitutes a deliberate
| obstruction of a lawful search.
|
| Tunick's Defense Team - The search was an unlawful,
| warrantless "fishing expedition"
| using a pretextual warning about
| child exploitation material to
| investigate Tunick's political
| ties to Atlanta's "Stop Cop City"
| movement.
|
| - Agents allegedly denied Tunick's
| requests for a lawyer and failed
| to read him his Miranda rights.
|
| - A motion to suppress the now-empty
| phone as evidence has been filed.
|
| Current Status
|
| A federal judge in Atlanta is expected to rule on the defense's motion >>> | to suppress evidence. If the judge allows the case to move forward, a
| trial could begin in the final months of the year, potentially
| establishing a major legal precedent for mobile encryption and border
| surveillance boundaries.

Lines marked with "| " come from my editing, where I start by writing
prompts for the chatbot and then edit the generated texts and format
them for USENET.

I thought in the US you had a constitutional right to not provide a
password if you didn't want to. He didn't need to go to this effort.

Legally this person was not within the US borders.
At least border control claims that.

He is US citizen and if they want him to commit to US laws then he is also entitled to his constitutional rights.


--- PyGate Linux v1.5.19
* Origin: Dragon's Lair, PyGate NNTP<>Fido Gate (3:633/10)

You might be interested in the New York Times article about this.
This link is a "gift link" ht the Times provides to get you past the
paywall:

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/28/us/duress-password-phone-wipe- charge.html?unlocked_article_code=1.11A.-71D.cHpCyMqJjlEg&smid=url-
share

--
"The power of accurate observation is frequently called cynicism by
those who don't have it." --George Bernard Shaw

--- PyGate Linux v1.5.19
* Origin: Dragon's Lair, PyGate NNTP<>Fido Gate (3:633/10)

On 31.07.26 02:23, Nuno Silva wrote:

On 2026-07-30, J”rg Lorenz wrote:

On 30.07.26 14:30, Chris wrote:

Stefan Ram <ram@zedat.fu-berlin.de> wrote:

| Samuel Tunick's landmark federal prosecution marks the first known
| U.S. case where an individual faces criminal felony charges specifi- >>>> | cally for using a software-built "duress passcode" to wipe a phone's >>>> | data during a border search.
|
| The case heavily intersects digital privacy rights, activism, and the >>>> | scope of government power at international borders.
|
| The Incident and the Software
|
| The Detainment In January 2025, Tunick - an Atlanta-based activist - >>>> | was pulled into a secondary inspection room by Customs and Border
| Protection (CBP) agents at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International
| Airport after returning from a vacation in the Dominican Republic.
|
| The Software Feature Tunick's Google Pixel was running GrapheneOS, >>>> | a privacy-hardened, open-source Android operating system. The OS fea- >>>> | tures a duress password mechanism. If an alternative, pre-configured >>>> | passcode is entered under coercion, the device immediately deletes
| its cryptographic keys and executes an irreversible, factory-reset
| data wipe without confirmation screens.
|
| The Trigger When CBP agents demanded his passcode, Tunick provided >>>> | the duress PIN. Officers entered the code themselves, causing the
| phone screen to go blank, flash, and completely erase its digital
| contents.
|
| The Federal Charges
|
| The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) indicted Tunick under 18 U.S.C. ? >>>> | 2232(a).
|
| - This federal statute prohibits the destruction or damage of property >>>> | to prevent its lawful seizure by authorities.
|
| - Traditionally applied to physical evidence (such as discarding drugs >>>> | or weapons during a raid), prosecutors are treating the
| software-driven data wipe as equivalent to destroying physical
| evidence.
|
| - Tunick has pleaded not guilty and faces up to five years in federal >>>> | prison if convicted.
|
| Legal Arguments & Precedent
|
| The case has sparked major concerns among digital civil liberties
| groups, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), because it >>>> | targets built-in device privacy features.
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------
| Position Core Arguments
| ------------------------- ----------------------------------
| Federal Prosecutors - Border searches do not require a
| warrant under the "border search
| exception" to the Fourth
| Amendment.
|
| - The physical phone is
| a container, but the data itself
| is seizable property.
|
| - Intentionally activating a wipe
| code constitutes a deliberate
| obstruction of a lawful search.
|
| Tunick's Defense Team - The search was an unlawful,
| warrantless "fishing expedition"
| using a pretextual warning about
| child exploitation material to
| investigate Tunick's political
| ties to Atlanta's "Stop Cop City"
| movement.
|
| - Agents allegedly denied Tunick's
| requests for a lawyer and failed
| to read him his Miranda rights.
|
| - A motion to suppress the now-empty
| phone as evidence has been filed.
|
| Current Status
|
| A federal judge in Atlanta is expected to rule on the defense's motion >>>> | to suppress evidence. If the judge allows the case to move forward, a >>>> | trial could begin in the final months of the year, potentially
| establishing a major legal precedent for mobile encryption and border >>>> | surveillance boundaries.

Lines marked with "| " come from my editing, where I start by writing >>>> prompts for the chatbot and then edit the generated texts and format >>>> them for USENET.

I thought in the US you had a constitutional right to not provide a
password if you didn't want to. He didn't need to go to this effort.

Legally this person was not within the US borders.
At least border control claims that.

Then their claims surely are void?

They are. Only the arrogant USA thinks it can apply illegal law
enforcement *outside* of the US to US and non-US citicens.


--
"Roma locuta, causa finita" (Augustinus)

--- PyGate Linux v1.5.19
* Origin: Dragon's Lair, PyGate NNTP<>Fido Gate (3:633/10)

On 31.07.26 08:47, Chris wrote:

J”rg Lorenz <hugybear@gmx.net> wrote:

On 30.07.26 14:30, Chris wrote:

Stefan Ram <ram@zedat.fu-berlin.de> wrote:

| Samuel Tunick's landmark federal prosecution marks the first known
| U.S. case where an individual faces criminal felony charges specifi- >>>> | cally for using a software-built "duress passcode" to wipe a phone's >>>> | data during a border search.
|
| The case heavily intersects digital privacy rights, activism, and the >>>> | scope of government power at international borders.
|
| The Incident and the Software
|
| The Detainment In January 2025, Tunick - an Atlanta-based activist - >>>> | was pulled into a secondary inspection room by Customs and Border
| Protection (CBP) agents at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International
| Airport after returning from a vacation in the Dominican Republic.
|
| The Software Feature Tunick's Google Pixel was running GrapheneOS, >>>> | a privacy-hardened, open-source Android operating system. The OS fea- >>>> | tures a duress password mechanism. If an alternative, pre-configured >>>> | passcode is entered under coercion, the device immediately deletes
| its cryptographic keys and executes an irreversible, factory-reset
| data wipe without confirmation screens.
|
| The Trigger When CBP agents demanded his passcode, Tunick provided >>>> | the duress PIN. Officers entered the code themselves, causing the
| phone screen to go blank, flash, and completely erase its digital
| contents.
|
| The Federal Charges
|
| The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) indicted Tunick under 18 U.S.C. ? >>>> | 2232(a).
|
| - This federal statute prohibits the destruction or damage of property >>>> | to prevent its lawful seizure by authorities.
|
| - Traditionally applied to physical evidence (such as discarding drugs >>>> | or weapons during a raid), prosecutors are treating the
| software-driven data wipe as equivalent to destroying physical
| evidence.
|
| - Tunick has pleaded not guilty and faces up to five years in federal >>>> | prison if convicted.
|
| Legal Arguments & Precedent
|
| The case has sparked major concerns among digital civil liberties
| groups, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), because it >>>> | targets built-in device privacy features.
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------
| Position Core Arguments
| ------------------------- ----------------------------------
| Federal Prosecutors - Border searches do not require a
| warrant under the "border search
| exception" to the Fourth
| Amendment.
|
| - The physical phone is
| a container, but the data itself
| is seizable property.
|
| - Intentionally activating a wipe
| code constitutes a deliberate
| obstruction of a lawful search.
|
| Tunick's Defense Team - The search was an unlawful,
| warrantless "fishing expedition"
| using a pretextual warning about
| child exploitation material to
| investigate Tunick's political
| ties to Atlanta's "Stop Cop City"
| movement.
|
| - Agents allegedly denied Tunick's
| requests for a lawyer and failed
| to read him his Miranda rights.
|
| - A motion to suppress the now-empty
| phone as evidence has been filed.
|
| Current Status
|
| A federal judge in Atlanta is expected to rule on the defense's motion >>>> | to suppress evidence. If the judge allows the case to move forward, a >>>> | trial could begin in the final months of the year, potentially
| establishing a major legal precedent for mobile encryption and border >>>> | surveillance boundaries.

Lines marked with "| " come from my editing, where I start by writing
prompts for the chatbot and then edit the generated texts and format
them for USENET.

I thought in the US you had a constitutional right to not provide a
password if you didn't want to. He didn't need to go to this effort.

Legally this person was not within the US borders.
At least border control claims that.

He is US citizen and if they want him to commit to US laws then he is also entitled to his constitutional rights.

That is exactly the inconsistency of this border control case and why
this body has IMHO no chance in court.


--
"Roma locuta, causa finita" (Augustinus)

--- PyGate Linux v1.5.19
* Origin: Dragon's Lair, PyGate NNTP<>Fido Gate (3:633/10)

On 2026-07-31, Eli the Bearded wrote:

In comp.mobile.android, Nuno Silva <nunojsilva@invalid.invalid> wrote:

On 2026-07-30, J”rg Lorenz wrote:

Legally this person was not within the US borders.
At least border control claims that.

Then their claims surely are void? They don't get to both claim US
jurisdiction for filing the charges and claim its absence for waiving
the rights, or do they? Am I walking into a montage of frames of Natalie
Portman next to Hayden Christensen?

They charged him with destruction of property to be seized, right?
That's what I read in this one paragraph grand jury finding:

https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.351975/gov.uscourts.gand.351975.1.0.pdf

I expect Customs has a long (if thin) history of attempting to seize contraband at the border and the would-be smuggler attempting (and
sometimes succeeding) in destroying the contraband before it can be
seized.

I don't think that is a controversial law.

What's controversial is considering the bits of data on his phone, not
merely the physical thing, as "property" that can be destroyed.

The question still stands, can they really enforce US law while not
granting the rights provided by said law?

I don't mean what they've been doing, I mean what a court of law would
deem legal if they don't prove they granted access to e.g. an attourney
as requested.

If you want to argue imaginary fairy cases, please don't make it seem
like you are talking about actual ones.

Then please provide sources that this has been ruled (in court)
acceptable for US authorities to do.

And I don't mean "suing for destruction of property" but rather the part
of not granting rights essential to due process.

I put forth mostly a question, I didn't make statements regarding what's legally the situation in the USA or the understanding of its judiciary,
if you're going to reply in this fashion, please do present something
concrete that actually adds some sort of answer. Otherwise, you're just
doing the thing you're criticizing me for doing.

If you want a minimally related case, there's always Miranda v. Arizona?

There may be a border search exemption somehow granted on top of the
fourth amendment, that's not where the issue would be, the issue would
be with refusing to provide access to legal assistance.

--
Nuno Silva

--- PyGate Linux v1.5.19
* Origin: Dragon's Lair, PyGate NNTP<>Fido Gate (3:633/10)

Stan Brown <someone@example.com> wrote:

You might be interested in the New York Times article about this.
This link is a "gift link" ht the Times provides to get you past the paywall:

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/28/us/duress-password-phone-wipe- charge.html?unlocked_article_code=1.11A.-71D.cHpCyMqJjlEg&smid=url-
share

Thanks!


--- PyGate Linux v1.5.19
* Origin: Dragon's Lair, PyGate NNTP<>Fido Gate (3:633/10)