Carrying the branding of online retailer Amazon, the jet was operated by 21 Air

Just a month before the fatal Boeing 767-300 freighter overrun at Miami on 6 September, a stark - and remarkably prescient - warning emerged from the other side of the Atlantic.

After analysing safety data and occurrence reports from operators, the UK Civil
Aviation Authority concluded that there was an concerning "trend" of unstable approaches being pressed to a landing rather than aborted.

Its safety notice on 4 August highlighted the "insidious" nature of such action, pointing out that a successful landing reinforces the belief that the decision was correct.

While the investigation into the 767 accident has barely started, there is already strong evidence that the aircraft wasn't even close to being correctly configured at the point it passed the standard 1,000ft stabilisation gate.

With no apparent signs of an urgent technical problem, which might have justified pursuing the landing, the inquiry will need to explain the seemingly inexplicable: why the crew persisted with an approach in defiance of multiple reasons to execute a go-around.

But such decisions - as the UK regulator suggests - are far from being an exception. The Flight Safety Foundation published a study in 2017 which contained a disturbing statistic.

"The collective industry performance of complying with go-around policies is extremely poor," it said, indicating that as few as 3% of unstable approaches resulted in go-around policy compliance.

Deep-seated human factors complicate the situation. Whether arising from operational, commercial or personal pressures, continuation bias is a well-known phenomenon, capable of overriding cues to abort, and one which becomes stronger as distance lessens and the runway comes into view.

Repeated recoveries from a marginal approach become associated with flying skill, reinforcing the view that go-around thresholds are conservative. Go-arounds, as a result, are relegated to the status of exception rather than rule.

This normalisation, of course, paradoxically means that go-arounds - which carry their own risks - can be perceived as the worse option if pilots lack experience or confidence in execution. Focusing exclusively on avoiding unstable approaches, without addressing go-around practice, is a blinkered strategy.

Precisely which combination of factors led to the Miami excursion is something which the National Transportation Safety Board will have to unravel.

Naturally the investigation will be examining specific aspects of 21 Air, among
them its crew training and operations.

But unstable approaches are not the sole preserve of cargo airlines, and any temptation to segregate the accident as a 'freight dog' issue would - given the
UK regulator's unease - be a grave miscalculation.

Via FlightGlobal Safety Briefing.

Vincent


--- Mageia Linux v10 X64/Mbse v1.1.7.2/GoldED+/LNX 1.1.5-b20260905
* Origin: Air Applewood, The Linux Gateway to the UK & Eire (2:250/1)

With no apparent signs of an urgent technical problem, which might have justified pursuing the landing, the inquiry will need to explain the seemingly inexplicable: why the crew persisted with an approach in
defiance of multiple reasons to execute a go-around.

The read-out of the CVR has already established the right-hand seat stating a too high speed which was not acknowledged by the captain. Poor CRM again and a second-officer not overruling his captain.

Where have we heard that before? Asiana at SFO? KLM at TFN? United in PDX? Air Florida in DCA? Many more ... especially Asian airlines.

\%/@rd

--- DB4 - 20260902
* Origin: AVIATION ECHO HQ (2:292/854)

Hello Ward!

14 Sep 26 22:51, you wrote to me:

With no apparent signs of an urgent technical problem, which might
have justified pursuing the landing, the inquiry will need to
explain the seemingly inexplicable: why the crew persisted with an
approach in defiance of multiple reasons to execute a go-around.

The read-out of the CVR has already established the right-hand seat
stating a too high speed which was not acknowledged by the captain.
Poor CRM again and a second-officer not overruling his captain.

Where have we heard that before? Asiana at SFO? KLM at TFN? United in
PDX? Air Florida in DCA? Many more ... especially Asian airlines.

Another point not indicated was that they had multiple flights and landings to same location that day and may well have exceeded duty limits.

Regardless it was a rookie mistake that even trainee's would have been more than aware of.

As an instructor I always used to say, if the approach was poor and too late to
sort out safely to 'always' go-round.

Better the cost of a bit of fuel against a/c damage, etc.

Vincent


--- Mageia Linux v10 X64/Mbse v1.1.7.2/GoldED+/LNX 1.1.5-b20260905
* Origin: Air Applewood, The Linux Gateway to the UK & Eire (2:250/1)

Another point not indicated was that they had multiple flights and
landings to same location that day and may well have exceeded duty
limits.

3 flights ...
CVG-MIA
MIA-SJU
SJU-MIA

... nothing out of the ordinary.

Their duty time was around 13 hours ... 11h37 total time between CVG and mishap in MIA. So nothing out of the ordinary either...

\%/@rd

--- DB4 - 20260902
* Origin: AVIATION ECHO HQ (2:292/854)